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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In conclusion, it would appear that in order to avoid the danger
that lower courts will construe this decision as do the dissenting
judges, this case should be viewed as an equivocal opinion designed
to grant the appellant her full day in court, and yet not intended
by the majority to effectuate drastic changes in both criminal and
constitutional law in New York.
JURY TRIAL - SURROGATE'S COURT - ExEcUTRIX HAS RIGHT
To JURY TRIAL UNDER NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION. -
Claimants petitioned for a compulsory accounting in the surrogate's
court nearly six years after the executrix of decedent's estate
rejected their claim for legal services. The executrix answered
that an accounting would be unnecessary since there were no
other claims pending against the estate, the assets of which
were sufficient to meet the claim if it was determined to be valid.
The executrix then demanded a trial by jury of the disputed claim.
In reversing the lower court decisions which rejected this latter
demand, a divided Court of Appeals held that petitioners' claim
was in the nature of an action at law for work, labor and services
for which a trial by jury was preserved by the New York State
Constitution. Matter of Garfield, 14 N.Y.2d 251, 200 N.E.2d
196, 251 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1964).
In 1830 the Revised Statutes of New York conferred upon
the surrogate's courts I the powers of equity formerly utilized in
administration suits in chancery.2 However, it should be noted
that a primary limitation on the equity jurisdiction in administration
suits was the necessity of first establishing disputed claims at law
where claimant would be afforded a jury trial.3 Therefore, in
ADMrNIsTRATIvE LAW 688 n.5 (4th ed. 1960); Vanderbilt, Functions and
Procedure of Administrative Tribunals, 12 U. CINc. L. REv. 117, 119-21(1938); Rourke, Law Enforcement Through Publicity, 24 U. CHr. L. REv.
225, 235 (1957).
1 Before the Revolutionary War the surrogate's court was called the
prerogative court. The colonial governor was its judge and his deputies were
called surrogates. In 1686 these courts were given the powers exercised in
England by the ecclesiastical courts. One of these powers was the settle-
ment and adjustment of executors' accounts. In 1788, by statute, the preroga-
tive court became the surrogate's court. See Malone v. Sts. Peter & Paul
Church, 172 N.Y. 269, 64 N.E. 961 (1902).
2 Matter of Kent, 92 Misc. 113, 120, 155 N.Y. Supp. 383, 387 (Surr.
Ct. 1915); 1 J'ESSuP-REDFmD, LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE SURROGATES'
COURTS IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 91 (rev. ed. 1947).
3 Matter of Kent, supra note 2, at 123, 155 N.Y. Supp. at 389.
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New York prior to 1895 a disputed claim against a decedent's
estate could not be heard and determined in the surrogate's court.
4
In 1895 an amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure provided
that a disputed claim could be determined by the surrogate upon
the judicial settlement of an executor's account, provided that the
claimant had not already commenced an action at law, and that
both parties had consented in writing.5  Parties who consented
to surrogate's court jurisdiction under this amendment waived
their right to a jury trial since at that time there was no provision
for such a trial in the surrogate's court.
Thus, by the close of the nineteenth century the surrogate's
courts had jurisdiction over the judicial settlement of accounts,
an equitable proceeding in which there was no trial by jury.
In addition, a rejected or disputed claim could be adjudicated by
either an action at law, where a trial by jury was available, or
by the surrogate himself without a jury, if both parties consented
in writing.
In 1914 the Surrogate's Court Act went into effect. It
contained "more liberal provisions than any other act ever affecting
the jurisdiction of the surrogates." 6 This act gave the surrogates
power "to administer justice in all matters relating to the affairs
of decedents . . . [and] to try and determine all questions, legal
or equitable, arising between any or all of the parties. . . ."
Furthermore, the act authorized a determination of a rejected and
disputed claim in the surrogate's court without the need for the
written consent of the parties. However, a claimant's right to
commence an action at law within a specified time from the
rejection of his claim by the executor was still assured. 8  A new
section was also added which authorized, for the first time, a
trial by jury of any controverted question of fact in the surrogate's
court, provided the party demanding a jury trial had a constitutional
right to such a trial.9
Prior to the 1914 act the executor's right to a trial by jury
of a disputed claim was certain since he could refuse to consent
to an adjudication by the surrogate. The Revisers' Report10
indicates that this act was not intended to deprive any party of
his right to a jury trial. The report further indicates that the
4 Matter of Martin, 211 N.Y. 328, 330, 105 N.E. 546, 547 (1914).
5 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1895, ch. 595, § 1822; Matter of Martin, mtpra note 4,
at 329, 105 N.E. at 547.
0 Matter of Kent, supra note 2, at 128, 155 N.Y. Supp. at 392.
7N.Y. Sess. Laws 1914, ch. 443, § 2510.
8 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1914, ch. 443, § 2681.
9 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1914, ch. 443, § 2538. This section is substantially
identical to N.Y. SuRR. CT. AcT § 68.
10 TH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO REVISE THE STATUTES IN RELATION
TO PRACTICE IN THE SUiOGArE'S COURT (1914) (hereinafter referred to as
REvss' REPo1~r).
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revisers believed that it would be unconstitutional to compel the
parties to try their "controverted questions of fact" without a
jury in the surrogate's court." Therefore, the primary question
when a demand for a jury trial is made is whether the person
claiming the privilege is entitled to it under the New York
Constitution.
The New York State Constitution of 1894 assured a jury trial
"in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed .. ,, 12
As noted above, prior to 1914 there were no jury trials in the
surrogate's court. It would therefore appear, at first glance, that
there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in an accounting
proceeding in the surrogate's court.' However, at that time disputed
claims were not adjudicated in the surrogate's court, but at law
where a jury trial was available. It was only with the adoption
of the Surrogate's Court Act of 1914 that those courts were given
jurisdiction to try disputed claims without the consent of the
parties.
The dilemma posed in the principal case is whether (1) the
nature of the (accounting) proceeding in the surrogate's court,
which is equitable and in which there has never been a right
to a jury trial, or (2) the nature of the claim, which is legal
and for which a trial by jury has traditionally been guaranteed,
should be the controlling factor. Past authorities indicate that
the nature of the proceeding is the deciding factor.14
"Ibid. Section 2536 of the N.Y. CODE OF CIV. PROC., entitled "Surrogate
may refer questions of fact," was amended in 1914 to read (in part):
"In a special proceeding other than one instituted for probate of a will,
and subject to the right of trial by jury of any question of fact, the Surro-
gate may, in his discretion, appoint a referee. . . " (Revisers recommended
addition in italics). Section 2677 of the N.Y. CODE OF Crv. PROC. is the
first section in the article relating to the presentation and proof of creditors'
claims. The Revisers' notes to that section state: "With provision for jury
trial and judicial settlement at the end of the advertising for creditors, all
claims can be tried on judicial settlement, and should be so tried without
right to reference or any action in supreme court." (Emphasis added.)
See Revisers' note to N.Y. CODE Cxv. PRoc., § 2537. But see General Note,
RmvisERs' REPORT 1.
12 N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 2 (1894). N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1954) is
substantially the same.
13 Matter of Leary, 175 Misc. 254, 23 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Surr. Ct.). aff'd sitb.
noam. Werner v. Reid, 260 App. Div. 1000, 24 N.Y.S.2d 1000, (1st Dep't
1940), aff'd, 285 N.Y. 693, 34 N.E.2d 383 (1941).
14 11 CARMODY-WAIT, ExcYcLoPEDIA OF NEw YORK PRACTICE § 271 (1954).
"Since accounting proceedings are considered equitable in nature, it is gener-
ally considered that the operation of § 68 of the Surrogate's Court Act does
not give any constitutional right to a jury trial in matters concerned with
the settlement of accounts even though the claimant against the estate mizht
have gone to a common-law court and there obtained a jury." Ibid. See
also 1 JEssuP-REFIELD, op. cit. supra note 2, § 420; 1 WARRmN, HEATON oxN
SURROGATES' COURTS § 108 f2(h) (1940); BuTLER, NEW YORK SURROGATE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 467 (1950).
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In Matter of Beer,15 the petitioner sought a compulsory ac-
counting after the administratrix rejected his claim. The admin-
istratrix then petitioned for a voluntary accounting and the pro-
ceedings were consolidated. Issues of fact were raised by the
petitioner and the administratrix demanded a trial by jury. The
appellate division, reversing the surrogate, held that such a trial
should have been granted as a matter of right. However, the
value of this case as precedent was severely weakened by the
leading case of Matter of Boyle.16
In Boyle the claimant requested a jury trial during an account-
ing proceeding, the administrator having previously rejected the
claim. The surrogate ordered a jury trial as of right and the
appellate division /affirmed, certifying to the court of appeals the
question: "Is the respondent . . entitled as a matter of right
to a trial by jury of her claim?" 17 The question certified was
answered in the negative, hence reversing the lower court. The
court of appeals indicated that Beer was merely one of two cases '8
in which a claimant's right to a trial by jury was upheld by the
appellate division. "' However, in Beer it was not a claimant who
demanded a jury trial, but an administratrix. This important
factual distinction was apparently overlooked when the court of
appeals decided Boyle. Consequently, since the holding in Boyle
denies the right of a claimant to a trial by jury, it may be concluded
that Boyle did not specifically overrule Beer because that case dealt
with the administratrix's right to a jury trial.20 However, the
generalized statements in the Boyle opinion, when removed from
their context, appear to deny the existence of any right to a
trial by jury in an accounting proceeding in the surrogate's court,
whether the party demanding such is the claimant or executor.2 1
15 188 App. Div. 894, 175 N.Y. Supp. 894 (2d Dep't 1919) (memorandum
decision). The surrogate's court decision is not officially reported, but the
facts are set forth in detail in Matter of Stein, 200 App. Div. 726, 193
N.Y. Supp. 298 (4th Dep't 1922).16242 N.Y. 342, 151 N.E. 821 (1926).
17 Id. at 344, 151 N.E. at 821.
28 The other case is Matter of Stein, 188 App. Div. 894, 175 N.Y. Supp.
894 (2d Dep't 1919).
19 "It is true that the Appellate Divisions of the second and fourth de-
partments have held that claimants under facts quite similar to those presented
in the present case were entitled as a matter of right to a jury trial."
Matter of Boyle, 242 N.Y. 342, 344, 151 N.E. 821 (1926). (Emphasis added.)20 The headnote to Matter of Boyle, which is not an official part of the
record, incorrectly states that Matter of Beer is overruled. See also 1
JEssuP-REDEmm, op. cit. supra note 2, § 421, at 469 n.13 which cites Matter
of Beer as being overruled by Matter of Boyle.
21With respect to N.Y. Suna. CT. AcT §68 the court stated: "The
statute gives an absolute right to a jury trial in a probate proceeding, but
there is no such right as to a rejected claim." Matter of Boyle, mipra note
19, at 345, 151 N.E. at 822.
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Matter of Boyle approved two earlier cases which had held,
in sweeping terms, that there was no right to a trial by jury
in an accounting proceeding. 22 Similarly, nearly all the cases
which have followed the rule in Boyle contain general statements
to the same effect. 23 However, none of these cases involved the
specific question presented in the instant case, viz., whether
an executor or an administrator24 is entitled to a jury trial as
a matter of constitutional right in an accounting proceeding.25
The majority in the principal case held that since the nature
of the claim is clearly legal, the right to a trial by jury is
guaranteed to either party by the New York State Constitution. 26
They noted that since the validity of the claim for work, labor
and services has not been determined, the executrix has 'no
matured fiduciary duty to the claimants and, therefore, there
are no equitable principles which govern the relationship between
the parties. The history of the development of the surrogate's
courts' powers in accounting proceedings would appear to support
the Court in this statement when it is recalled that before 1895
a disputed claim first had to be established at law.
22 Matter of Beare, 122 Misc. 519, 203 N.Y. Supp. 483 (Surr. Ct. 1924),
aff'd, 214 App. Div. 723, 209 N.Y. Supp. 793 (1st Dep't 1925); Matter of
Woodward, 105 Misc. 446, 173 N.Y. Supp. 556 (Surr. Ct. 1918), aff'd, 188
App. Div. 888, 175 N.Y. Supp. 926 (1st Dep't 1919).23 E.g., Raymond v. Davis, 220 App. Div. 480, 221 N.Y. Supp. 675 (4th
Dep't 1927), rev'd on other grounds, 248 N.Y. 67, 161 N.E. 421 (1928);
Matter of Ludlam, 5 Misc. 2d 1068, 162 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Surr. Ct 1957).
24AIl distinctions made hereafter between a claimant and an executor
apply equally well for a claimant and an administrator.25 Supra note 23. But see Matter of Woodward, supra note 22, where
it appears that the demand for a jury trial was filed by the executrix.
However, the surrogate seems to have decided the case as if the demand for
a jury trial was made by the creditor.
Thus, while the authorities do not specifically decide whether or not an
executor has a right to a jury trial in an accounting proceeding, they do seem
to indicate in general statements, that since an accounting proceeding is
equitable in nature there is no right to a jury trial by either party. See
TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON MODERNIZATION, RE vISION AND SIMPLIFI-
CATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES, SECOND REPORT TO GOVERNOR AND LFXis-
LATURE (1963), where the Commission states that there is no right to a jury
trial in an accounting proceeding, but yet seems to believe that it would be
unconstitutional to deprive a claimant of his right to secure such a trial.
The Commission's comment to § 211-c reads, in part: "Under the proposed
new section 211-a, a claimant's right to an adjudication on a rejected claim
would be limited to accounting proceedings in which as we also know jury
trials are not available, at least as a matter of right. Hence it seems ad-
visable to recommend a section which would say in terms that nothing in
the article shall prevent a claimant from bringing an action on his claim
at law or in equity." Id. at 365-66. (Emphasis added.) It is interesting
to note that no mention is made of the executor's corresponding right.
26latter of Garfield, 14 N.Y.2d 251, 200 N.E.2d 196, 251 N.Y.S.2d 7
(1964).
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The Court also stated that the legislature has not the power
to "deprive a party who would have had a right to jury trial
at common law of such right by authorizing a court of equity
to take jurisdiction." 27  Section 211 of the Surrogate's Court Act,
as it appeared before the 1964 changes, 28 provided that if a claimant
did not bring an action at law on a rejected claim, that claim
would be decided in the surrogate's court upon the judicial settle-
ment of the executor's account without the consent of the parties.
However, the executor had no choice of courts since he had to
represent the estate in the court chosen by the claimant. The
Court reasoned that since the cause of action asserted by the claim-
ants is legal, the executor had a constitutional right to a trial by jury.
Yet, section 211 appears to preclude this right in the case of the
executor. Nevertheless, the Court avoided ruling section 211
unconstitutional by holding that the legislative history of Section
68 of the Surrogate's Court Act, which provided for jury trials
in the surrogate's court in certain cases, "was intended to preserve
the existing right of jury trial in creditors' claims arising on
judicial settlement." 29
The Court analogized the situation presented in the principal
case to one where a plaintiff brings a suit in equity by joining
legal and equitable causes thereby forcing the defendant to defend
the legal action in a court of equity. It was held that in the latter
situation the defendant, although in equity, did not lose his right
to a trial by jury.30 This analogy was disputed by the dissent
which declared that an executor is not brought into equity since
one of the responsibilities of the executor is the duty to account
for assets that have come into his possession. 1 The reasoning is
that by accepting his letters the executor is already in equity
and subject to its processes. However, the history of the de-
velopment of the surrogate's courts would appear to lend its
support to the rationale of the majority, since historically a claim
of this nature was always decided at law.
The impact of this decision could have far-reaching effects
on the orderly and speedy administration of justice in the surro-
gate's courts of New York. An executor now has the right to
demand a jury trial of claims presented against the estate. An
executor who felt that he was in a good "jury position" might
be induced to assert his right to a trial by jury against every
claim asserted against him. In discussing the consequence of
allowing such jury trials in the surrogate's courts, Surrogate Fowler
27Id. at 258, 200 N.E.2d at 199, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
28 N.Y. SuRR. CT. Acr §211 (1963).
29 Matter of Garfield, supra note 26, at 259, 200 N.E.2d at 200, 251
N.Y.S.2d at 12.
sold. at 258, 200 N.E.2d at 199, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 11.31id. at 262, 200 N.E.2d at 201, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 14 (dissenting opinion).
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stated that "such a practice if inaugurated would end only in con-
fusion, delay and injustice .... ,, 32 The fact that few executors
have demanded such a trial in the past may be attributable to the
earlier authorities which strongly indicate that the courts, the bar,
and legal scholars believed that there was no such right to a trial
by jury in an accounting proceeding in the surrogate's courts. The
decision in Garfield is sure to substantially increase such demands.
The New York Court of Appeals has rectified a long standing
misconception as to the executor's right to a trial by jury in an
accounting proceeding. The decision is strongly supported by the
history of the development of the surrogate's courts' powers, since
such claims at common law were triable at law where a jury was
available. The expansion of surrogate court jurisdiction should not
eliminate the right to have a jury trial in these cases. Although
the decision in the principal case may cause some confusion and
consternation in the surrogate's courts, the right to a trial by
a jury of peers is a fundamental constitutional right and this
decision is a reaffirmation thereof.
M
LABOR LAw - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT - RECOG-
NITIONAL PICKETING IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 8(b) (7) (C)
HELD INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT INJUNCTIvE RELIEF. - Peti-
tioner, a distributor of paper products, had for a number of years
entered into collective bargaining agreements with respondent union.
The most recent agreement expired; and when the parties were
unable to agree on a new contract the union filed charges with the
National Labor Relations Board alleging a refusal to bargain.
These charges were subsequently determined by the Board to be
without foundation; however, the union continued to picket. The
Regional Director sought an injunction under Section 10(1)' of the
National Labor Relations Act alleging that the acts of the union
constituted recognitional picketing in violation of section 8(b) (7)
32 Matter of Woodward, supra note 22, at 449, 173 N.Y. Supp. at 558.
'Section 10(l) of the act reads in part: "Whenever it is charged that
any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of
. . . section 158(b) (7) of this title, the preliminary investigation of such
charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases except
cases of like character. . . . Upon the filing of .. . [a] petition the district
court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary
restraining order as it deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of law. . . ." Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act) § 704(d), 73 Stat. 544, 29 U.S.C. § 160(l)
(Supp. IV, 1963).
